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Viewed from London, Los Angeles, New York, Berlin, Paris and Milan, the south of 
the world is invariably considered in terms of lacks and absences. It is not yet modern, 
it has still to catch up. It remains, as Dipesh Chakrabarty would put it, an inadequate 
place (Chakrabarty 2000). The south is spatially and temporally located elsewhere, at 
the edge of the map. Of course, as we know from Edward Said, and through him from 
Antonio Gramsci, this is a geography of power. It is about being placed and 
systematised in a manner not of your own choosing. It is about being rendered 
subordinate and subaltern to other forces, and being exploited, not only economically, 
but also politically and culturally, in order for that subalternity to be reproduced and 
reinforced. The south of the world is framed: not only conceptually enclosed, but also 
falsely accused of failing to respect a modernity being triumphantly pursued 
elsewhere. To return to the south as a critical, political and historical problem is, 
ultimately, to return to the north and its hegemonic management of the planet. The ills, 
failures and breakdowns that are located down there, across the border, are precisely 
the products of a northern will to make the world over in its image and interests. This 
is the political economy of location. Here the south, of Italy, of Europe, of the 
Mediterranean, of the world, is rendered both marginal but paradoxically central to the 
reproduction of that economy. If the whole world were equally modern then the logic 
that drives modernity would collapse. The cancellation of the inequalities, property 
and differences charging the planetary circuits of capitalist accumulation would render 
modernity superfluous. The subversion of linearity, and the evaporation of ‘progress’ 
and development would also undo historical time as it is presently understood. The 
‘south’ as a political and historical question is, above all, about the power exercised on 
those held in its definitions.  
 
BRIGANDS, MAFIA, LAZY PEASANTS AND CORRUPTION 
If the stereotypical south of Italy is inhabited by brigands, mafia, lazy peasants and 
corruption we need, as a minimum, to understand the historical processes that led to 
this state of affairs. But then history always provides us with an ambiguous archive. 
Irreducible to simple causality and a transparent rationality, the ‘south’ emerges as a 
category, a construction, an invention (Petrusewicz 1998). Its definition reveals the 
semiotics of power.  The ‘south’ is always destined to experience that combination of 
repression and refusal that marks the foreclosure of hegemony seeking to negate the 
trauma of its violent affirmation (Mellino 2012).  
 
It is in within this matrix that we might turn to the unification and the creation of the 
modern Italy, engineered on the back of the conquest of one sovereign state (the 
Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies) by another (the Piedmont monarchy of the 
House of Savoy). Behind the offensive labelling of its inhabitants, and the reduction of 
rebellion, resistance and refusal to that conquest as ‘brigandage’, there existed an 
altogether more complex social and political world. This was characterised by the 
brutal exercise of feudal powers, whose representatives willing allied themselves to the 
new national Parliament and political order in order to continue their rule over the land 
and its peasantry. In brokering hegemonic interests, agricultural reform was 
deliberately avoided by the new, unitary state. It is really only after the conclusion of 
the Second World War that a certain degree of post-feudal land reform occurs in Italy. 
In the terrible conditions of agricultural life and labour, the fact that the ‘bosses’ live in 
Naples or Turin, and state authority shifts from Naples to Rome, makes little 
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difference. Reading Carlo Levi’s Christ Stopped at Eboli, and registering the nuanced 
critique of Italian unification in Mario Martone’s recent film Noi Credevamo (based 
on Anna Banti’s beautiful novel), one stumbles across the persistent repression and 
exclusion of a subaltern peasantry from the national narrative. This, of course, is the 
key motif in Gramsci’s analysis of the ‘failure’ of Italian unification. 
 
Here it would be hypocritical to talk in terms of a historical progress that was directly 
attributable to the transit to the modern nation. The military occupation and juridical 
enforcement of unification in southern Italy, in the wake of military operations that 
witnessed the deployment of 120,000 troops and resulted in at least 30,000 dead, was 
followed by mass migration from rural poverty to the Americas. Subsequent colonial 
adventures in east Africa and Libya (home at one time to 150,000 Italians) were also 
considered a potential safety valve to relieve the pressure of southern destitution. 
There is no linear advancement here but rather a contorted spiral of development 
where the resources of southern Italy often fuelled northern interests and development. 
If the feudal regime of the Bourbons was suppressed and forcefully incorporated into 
the modern Italian state, the latter tended to govern this southern acquisition through 
the bio-political grammar of alterity, thereby evading the responsibilities that a 
centralised national government could have exercised in economic and cultural, and 
not just political, terms. The subordination of the south to northern concerns was a 
power relation. It was justified in the languages of colonialism and racism, and it 
rendered the south inferior, less European, inherently underdeveloped. This, of course, 
was a particular instance of the far wider appropriation of the Mediterranean and the 
south of Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece and the Balkans), not to speak of the extra-
European world, when viewed and framed from London, Paris, Berlin, Turin, and later 
Rome. The south is relegated to the margins of the national epic, its existing 
conditions are considered an impediment to the realisation of ‘progress’, its history is 
yet to come. In this sense, Christ Stopped at Eboli becomes a profoundly instructive 
political text. 
 
The long national debate on the ‘southern question’ that accompanies the history of 
modern Italy and the incorporation of the ex-kingdom of the two Sicilies into the new 
nation constantly veers between outcries against an aggressive, northern act of 
deliberate colonisation and the more academic discussion of national and international 
cycles and rhythms evidencing uneven development. If, on the one side, the north 
apparently robbed the south of its financial assets in order to establish its industrial 
base, and in the process waged a war on the population in order to exercise this right, 
this was counterbalanced by a liberal paternalism that saw its task of dragging the 
south out of decadent government and feudal inefficiency in order to render it modern. 
While the colonising imperative that saw in the south an exotic world of disturbing 
alterity still remains very much in play today in internal racisms (and the Northern 
League is symptomatic of that virulent syntax), the liberal insistence on educating the 
south through a programmed ‘progress’ also continued to dominate the state policy of 
post-1945 Italy. The clearest manifestation of the latter approach was the creation in 
1950 of a national fund – Cassa del Mezzogiorno – for financing the development of 
southern Italy. This was to launch the era of the notorious ‘cathedrals in the desert’: 
industrial plant parachuted into rural, southern Italy that was supposed to kick-start the 
local economy. Despite the massive amounts of money involved it was a historical 
failure; or, rather, its economic and social aims were largely side-tracked into the 
machinery of sustaining and reproducing political power. In this sense, it was by no 
means an exclusively ‘southern question’, but rather a component in the composition 
 
 
3 
and management of a national mosaic of political powers, financial interests and 
industrial groups. 
 
One of the more obvious examples of this mechanism is that of the complex 
interweaving of national and local powers which witnessed political party machinery 
and organised crime allied in the creation and reproduction of political and cultural 
hegemony. This had already been encouraged by the Allied war authorities in their 
conquest of Sicily and southern Italy from Fascism after 1943. This alliance stretched 
from the maintenance of everyday, local consensus through political patronage and 
organised crime to domestic Cold War containment of political unrest and the 
subsequent crisis management of national emergencies and disasters. The 1980 
earthquake in Campania is here emblematic. Massive state funding simultaneously 
consolidated and extended political power and organised crime at both the local and 
national level. The details, of course, are complicated, but again it is clear that the 
seemingly separate specificity of the ‘southern question’ is fully integrated into the 
political and economic arrangements that compose the national (and international) 
picture.  
 
The continuing twentieth mass migration of the reserve army of labour of southern 
Italians to northern Italy and northern Europe, on the back of migration to the 
Americas and north Africa, alerts us to this structural reality, accompanied by the 
conceptual force of alterity and the periphery in composing and reaffirming the 
‘centre’. This needs to be consistently borne in mind if we want to avoid being 
dragged into an endless and fruitless debate over-determined by stereotypical 
language, racialising prejudices, and a bio-politics passing for common sense. 
Migration also reminds us of the shifting and heterogeneous conditions of 
transnational labour. While migration from the south of the world has serviced the 
north, the Italian south itself is today clearly destined never to be industrialised – today 
that nineteenth century model of ‘progress’ has literally migrated elsewhere, to be 
charted in the megapolises of Shanghai, Mumbia and Lagos. The labour pool has been 
outsourced along global networks that draw upon capital gains and infrastructures that 
the Mezzogiorno will never have. It is clearly necessary to change perspective and 
seek to reformulate the ‘southern question’. To do this, I suggest we need to adopt 
another series of coordinates and maps. 
 
THE ESCAPE FROM LOCALISM  
I believe that Antonio Gramsci helps us to identify a series of elements that pull the 
question out of its immediate historical and critical coordinates in post-unification 
Italy and allows us to better consider its contemporary implications. Here we will 
discover that it is no longer possible to talk of a ‘southern question’ within the 
boundaries of the Italian nation state, and perhaps, despite all the immediate 
peculiarities of the ‘Mezzogiorno’, it never was. Without anticipating the argument, 
there lies here the suggestion that the ‘southern question’, identified as a political 
problem, and as a historical and cultural question, was not external to the modernity 
that presumed could resolve it. It was, and is, internal to modern Europe and the 
formation of its nation states. In an important sense, seeking to respond to the 
‘southern question’ ultimately implies replying to the structural inequalities and 
distribution of power that accompanies the formation of nation building and 
Occidental modernity. I feel, as Gramsci himself once put it, that this ‘thinking 
globally’ is of significance in casting what seems an almost unresolvable historical, 
cultural and political dilemma into a more extensive critical space. Such a wider map 
throws a suggestive critical light back into the specificities of the Italian case. 
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I would argue that it is imperative to acknowledge further landmarks when referencing 
the ‘southern question’. To avoid remaining trapped in a tangle of historical and 
cultural debate that reconstructs and deconstructs the question it is perhaps time to 
apply a critical cut. A local inheritance can never be cancelled, but it can be exposed to 
other questions, shifted into a new critical space. To step beyond the South’s location 
in existing knowledge-power relationships, and follow Edward Said’s proposal to de-
orientalise the logic that reconfirms subordination in a self-perpetuating discourse, is 
to adopt a postcolonial approach. This is to insist that the colonisation and construction 
of the ‘periphery’ is essential for the sustenance and extension of metropolitan power. 
The rest of the world is not simply an accessory and witness to Occidental progress but 
is deeply stitched into its fabric of production and reproduction. It does not simply 
absorb and consume modernity; in its labour power, cultural forces and political 
antagonisms, it produces modernity. It is not simply where modernity recycles and 
dumps the refuse of ‘progress’, it is the very matrix of a modernity that requires the 
world, and not simply the West, in order extract, circulate and accumulate its riches 
and authority (Mezzadra and Nielson 2013), 
 
Beyond the pertinent provocation of Franco Cassano’s ‘southern thought’ refusing a 
subaltern status, a postcolonial engagement allows us to promote an understanding of 
the southern question from the south itself (Cassano 2011). This is not simply to 
overturn the prevailing accounts that tend to reduce the Mezzogiorno of Italy to a 
stable and homogeneous object of analysis, robbing it of subjective agency. It also 
permits a wider exercise in challenging the premises and protocols of the critical 
machinery that believes that its version of ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ is unique and 
hence universal.  
 
Simultaneously, this also allows us to re-locate the Italian ‘southern question’ on a 
wider Mediterranean map. Here we are forced to annotate the annexation of southern 
Italy and subsequent national unification within the same temporal frame of the French 
annexation of Algeria and the British take-over of Egypt. Modalities of appropriation 
were different, the combination of histories never the same, although there was always 
the same military might, death and destruction to back up and enforce the enterprise. 
In the extension of one rule and law over another we find ourselves in the common 
nineteenth century matrix of colonialism that extends, without request, the civilising 
mission of the West to the rest. As a minimum, this establishes the Italian southern 
question in a colonial framework, not too dissimilar to the experiences of Scotland and 
Ireland and their political, administrative, cultural and military subordination to 
London and the unification of Great Britain. 
 
In The Southern Question (1926), the Sardinian intellectual Antonio Gramsci offered a 
lucid analysis of the structural impoverishment of southern Italy in terms of existing 
economical, political and cultural forces. He spoke of stagnation characterized by the 
mass of peasantry in the economical and political clutches of large, often absentee, 
land owners. He also spoke of southern intellectuals supplying the administrative 
personnel of the Italian state, both locally and nationally, and of the role of such 
intellectuals (he was referring in particular to Benedetto Croce) in reproducing the 
status quo. Ten years later, incarcerated in a Fascist prison, he was to observe: 
 
The poverty of the Mezzogiorno was historically incomprehensible for the 
popular masses of the North; they could not comprehend that national unity was 
not achieved on the basis of equality, but as the result of the hegemony of the 
 
 
5 
North on the Mezzogiorno and the territorial relationship of the city to the 
countryside; the North was an ‘octopus’ that enriched itself at the cost of the 
South, its industrial and economic progress was in a direct relationship to the 
impoverishment of southern industry and agriculture. (Gramsci 1975: 2021-
2022) 
 
Much of what Gramsci had to say then continues to echo within the existing political 
economy of the South and in its one time capital, Naples. Yet the ‘sources’ of this 
malaise perhaps lie not only in local coordinates, but also in a deep-seated inheritance 
that today would be considered part and parcel of the processes of 
‘globalization’(Chambers 2008). 
 
Naples, unlike Genoa and Venice, was never a major port and commercial centre in 
the manner of its northern cousins. Up to the end of the sixteenth century Venice and 
Genoa were ‘world ports’, central to a trading system that stretched from Bombay to 
Lima. The port of Naples served mainly for the importation of foodstuffs from Sicily 
and Puglia to feed its metropolitan population and immediate hinterland. In 1615 
Naples was buying pepper from Livorno that had arrived via London. By then it was 
no longer the Mediterranean that sold spices to England and northern Europe, but 
spices arriving from London and Amsterdam that were now sold to the Mediterranean 
in the ports of Livorno, Naples and Istanbul. By the end of the seventeenth century 
virtually all of the sea-borne commercial traffic of the Kingdom of Naples was 
transported on English merchant ships. In the second half of the century the hegemony 
of English commerce in the Mediterranean, reinforced by the regular presence of the 
Royal Navy, supervised the structural undoing of the relationship between a 
commercial and industrial northern Italy and its complementary relationship to the 
agricultural south. Both the north, with its own commerce, cloth and silk industries 
subordinated to the needs of London and the emerging English textile industry, and the 
agricultural south, were equally transformed into sources for primary materials for the 
markets and merchandising of northern Europe and the Atlantic seaboard. By 1680 the 
conditions of the ‘southern question’ –economic underdevelopment, social 
backwardness and cultural isolation from northern Italy – had been established, not so 
much through Spanish domination of the Kingdom of Naples, or northern Italian 
‘progress’, where capital once invested in sea-going ventures was now conserved in 
the security of land and revenue, as by English mercantile hegemony in the 
Mediterranean (Pagano de Divitiis 1997).  
 
These historical observation might provide one way to re-open the ‘southern question’. 
They serve, above all, to insist on the critical necessity of adopting a diverse 
cartography in order to step out of the straight-jacket of a debate, overwhelmingly 
shaped by regional and national concerns, that urgently needs to be ‘provincialized’ 
(Chakrabarty 2000). The pauperisation of the peasantry in the rural fringes of an 
emerging modern European – both in Calabria and in the Highlands of Scotland – are 
as interconnected as the price of pepper on the London Stock Exchange and in the 
markets of Naples and Istanbul. In the following century, the nascent Neapolitan 
Republic, directly inspired by the French Revolution, will be crushed in May 1799 by 
a peasant army overseen by the presence of the British fleet in the Bay of Naples. Part 
of that fleet, together with its commander Admiral Horatio Nelson, had the previous 
year destroyed French naval forces in Egyptian waters in the Battle of Abouikir Bay. 
In the very same period, republican France was refusing the demands of the slaves in 
revolt to extend the terms of the French Revolution to its Caribbean colony Saint-
Dominique. Freedom, equality and brotherhood were denied until the ‘Black Jacobins’ 
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successfully expunged French control and established the black republic of Haiti in 
1804.  
 
These wider coordinates are not intended to stifle the local narrative. If anything they 
serve to deepen and extend that account in the belief that they help us to grasp the 
historical and cultural density of the question in the context of the ‘global colonial 
archive’ (Conelli 2013). What holds this particular picture together in the first instance 
is the struggle for world hegemony between Britain and France, waged in the many 
corners of Europe, from Spain and Italy to the steppes of Russia, as well as across the 
seas and islands of the world. This exercise of power, its administrative, military, 
economical and cultural organisation – frequently out-sourced to non-nationals (Polish 
troops deployed in the unsuccessful French attempts to reconquer Saint-Dominique, 
black African sailors in the British fleet) – was in the last instance about the control of 
resources, riches and markets required in order to command the world and ensure the 
planetary reproduction of its political economy. 
 
With this in mind we could now move back to the ‘southern question’ with a further 
set of concerns. One of the central features that emerges from the incorporation of the 
ex-Kingdom of the Two Sicilies into the new Italian state in 1861 is that of the 
systematic racialisation of the south (Moe 2002). The evidence – drawn from 
Piedmont officers and government officials involved in the ‘pacification’ of the 
Mezzogiorno, to subsequent endorsement by sociologists, anthropologists and 
criminologists – is overwhelming. Southern Italy, whether explained in biological or 
historical terms, is populated by an inferior ‘race’. The racialisation of southern Italy 
was an essential part of its subordination to colonisation by the nascent national state, 
that in turn applied verdicts already rehearsed by visitors in English, German and 
French. Anthropological generalisations quickly flowed into a more precise 
institutional regime of knowledge through the criminalisation of dissent and revolt. It 
produced a pathology to be catalogued, studied and defined. Historical and cultural 
differences were transformed into arbitrary distinctions. These acquired the legislative 
force to incorporate, discipline and educate the captured, subordinated body. Once 
defined, catalogued and located, that body reconfirmed the practices and procedures of 
its objectification. Even if we might want today to consign such perspectives to the 
closed chapter of European positivism, such practices seeped down into the practices 
of everyday life and cast long historical shadows. In the opening sequences of Luchino 
Visconti’s Rocco and his brothers (1960), the arrival from Lucania of the Parondi 
family in a Milanese housing estate is simply greeted with the exclamation ‘Africa’. 
 
The transference of landed property to financial gain and commercial profit, of the 
revenue of rural estates to industrial and financial capital and urban life styles, 
accompanied by the passage from peasantry to the national and international labour 
market, is a constant rhythm in the formation of the modern political economy since 
1500. In the planetary processes induced by capitalist accumulation there are 
obviously many regional differentiations, within the nation as well as beyond its 
frontiers. Some would call them time-lags and apply the terminology of backwardness 
and underdevelopment to explain their presence. Here history is apparently a train 
called Progress that carries us into the future. However, when slavery co-exists with 
the foundation of republican democracy, as in the Atlantic world of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and feudal land ties with the establishment of modern industrial 
plant, as in Italy in the first half of the twentieth century, it is perhaps critically more 
instructive to consider their political interaction and historical complementarity. 
Rather than assume that one dimension (modern, democratic and industrial) is separate 
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and superior to the negative survival of the seemingly archaic histories of slavery and 
feudalism we need to acknowledge their being coeval. And if we are understanding 
these to be planetary, and not merely national, conditions and forces, then we are 
required to recognise this dissonant and heterogeneous history to be integral to 
modernity; that is, to be the history of modernity itself.  
 
The violent accumulation of capital does not simply lie back there with slave labour, 
colonialism and racialised hegemony, or with expropriation of the commons, the 
expulsion of peasantry from the land and its subsequent enclosure by a land-owning 
class seeking to invest its gains elsewhere (in the colonies, in industry, in buildings, 
transport and cultural goods). It continues. There is no simple passage from an original 
or primitive accumulation to a subsequently more civil and ordered one. Eighteenth 
century Scottish crofters despatched to Canada after the crushing of the 1745 
Rebellion, peasants moving from Lucania to Milan and the Alfa Romeo factory in the 
1950s and 1960s (the subject of Luchino Visconti’s 1961 film, Rocco and his 
brothers), and present-day Chinese labour migrating in millions from rural areas to the 
high-tech belts of Guangdong, Shaanxi, Qingdao and Shenzhen, are part of a shared 
spatio-temporality. In other words the creative destruction of territory and time by 
capital that produces a mobile constellation of effects on a planetary level is not to be 
explained in terms of the linear succession of circles of development irradiating out 
from a primary centre in Europe. The resources that went into European development, 
as the history of modern racial slavery so powerfully portrays  – both in its labour and 
in its abolition and compensatory payments – always depended on a planetary network 
of conquest, exploitation and management (Hall 2013). Dispossession, expropriation 
and unilateral control of land, law and political licence are not simply the prerogative 
of Seventeenth century England and life in the North American colonies; they are very 
much part of our world today. That ‘original’ violence persists – from seeking to 
patent medicinal plants to bulldozing villages and towns into dams. It is part, as 
Kalyan Sanyal has argued, of the very reproduction of capital: it is not a trace of the 
past, but rather an unstable universalism oriented to the future (Sanyal 2007). Rather 
than localised transitions to accumulation, registered in the linear fashioning of time, 
there are transformations that reach through a mosaic of temporal and spatial scales 
and coordinates, sometimes subtle and subterfuge, more usually brutal, violent and 
without redress. 
 
These considerations throw a very different light into the ‘southern question’. Here we 
discover not pockets of underdevelopment, inhabited by those who apparently live 
outside the measured time of modernity and have not yet been invested by progress, 
but what Gramsci referred to as ‘traces of autonomous initiatives’. These signal the 
multiple contours of the modern world where a hegemonic pulse is folded into local 
performances, crossed by translation and mixed by tradition, sounded and sourced in 
the on-going construction of place and belonging. The blueprint is dirtied and 
deviated, punctuated by the dense grammars of cultural immediacies, by a resistance 
to a singular will (Chambers 2013). 
 
What lies ‘south of the border’, in the undisciplined excess of life that seemingly does 
not respect the rules, is clearly a threat to the disciplined productivity of the linear 
accumulation of capitalist and cultural redemption. These other, southern, spaces, 
however, are not merely decadent and unruly peripheries, expelled from the motor of 
modernity. They propose the challenge of heterotopia. Although constantly seeking to 
establish borders, set limits, monitor unrest and patrol confines, modernity is unable to 
produce a distinct exterior, a not yet modern or still primitive elsewhere. What is 
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othered, rendered subaltern and subordinate within the institutions and practices of 
‘advanced’ capitalist culture is at the same time structurally integral to the very 
production and reproduction of dominance and subordination (Mezzadra 2011). The 
negated, feared and despised ‘native’, black, Arab, Muslim, Rom, and migrant other is 
inside the modernity that seeks to define, discipline and decide his or her place. No 
matter how objectified and anonymously rendered, the subaltern is nevertheless a 
historical actor, a subjectivising force within a shared but differentiated universe 
(Guha 2003). The chains of power are here tested (and not simply suffered), stretched 
and sometimes snap. If, then, there is no absolute outside to house the excluded and 
the damned, there is also no untouched nor pure alternative to the historical network 
and assemblage in which these political and cultural relations are inscribed. It is 
precisely in this sense, that the ‘southern question’ irrupts within the midst of a 
modernity still to be registered and recognised. 
 
Exemplified in Carlo Levi’s Christ Stopped at Eboli, Ernesto De Martino’s 
ethnographic field research in the Mezzogiorno of Italy in the 1950s, and the cinema 
of Pier Paolo Pasolini, seemingly pre-modern practices, beliefs and customs are not 
‘back there’, in an abjured or primitive past, but are ‘in here’, part of the stratified and 
subaltern complexities of the present. Through rendering the familiar unhomely and 
out of joint, the present becomes plural and incomplete; that is, irreducible to a single 
point of view or manner of narration. Along this critical path lies the injunction to 
think less of the south and rather more with the south. Here, where historical, cultural 
and structural conditions have been formed in subordination to the needs of the north 
of the world, the predictable critical frame is decentred and destabilised. The powerful 
lessons of the Subaltern Studies group in India, of the lengthy tradition of Black 
Atlantic intellectuals and artists, of the critical constellation of radical Latin American 
thought and practice, clearly confirms this point. The abstract universalisms of 
‘progress’, ‘humanism’ and ‘democracy’ unwind in the cruel insistence of their being 
historical embedded in power, exploitation and unjust cultural detail. This observation, 
most obviously drawn from Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, allows us to register 
the structural inequalities of economic, political, social and cultural justice that 
characterise the souths of the planet while at the same time harvesting the specificities 
of a precise elaboration of space and time that distinguishes one place from another.  
 
RADICAL RURALITY 
To remain in the rural south for a moment also allows us to continue to cultivate 
further lines of flight from conventional accounts of this region as a political problem. 
I, personally, have had some involvement in projects that have sought in mountain 
areas to encourage a radical revaluation of contemporary rurality in the light of 
modern memory and migration (Chambers. et.al, 2007). Associated with this 
involvement is the ethno-literature and proposed ‘ruralogy’ (paesologia) of the writer 
Franco Arminio who poetically reworks a received inheritance into a modality of 
modern connections (Arminio 2011). In a form of psychogeography, Armino’s words 
drift in rural landscapes that actively query their subaltern location in the mappings of 
modernity. What comes to be registered are an impossible set of roots: village life is 
neither autonomous nor separated from the modernity that produces it as alterity. 
There emerges the awareness that belonging draws upon a series of locations: from a 
high mountain village in Matese to a suburb of New York. It is a process impossible to 
confine to a single place. This provides another critical compass with which to 
navigate the multiple spaces of modernity. Perhaps this is a lesson that was first learnt 
by rural folk. If their lives were subordinated to the demands of the metropolis, they 
experienced migration, social upheaval and transformation under the sign of the city 
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long before the inhabitants of the city began querying their own assumed stability. In 
the same manner, the rest of the world has experienced precarious livelihood, 
structural unemployment and the violence of capital in colonial conditions for many 
decades prior to the ingression of these conditions into the heartlands of the West 
itself.  
 
The external, rural interruption, is, of course, not really external, only repressed and 
negated, consigned to the margins. Today’s metropolis is the modern world. And if the 
city does not fully absorb the surrounding world it does, however, profoundly 
discipline its horizons of expectancy. In this sense, the rural scene provides one of the 
places and temporalities of modernity. It is not on the outside. It circulates within as a 
potential critical seed. It proposes another rurality that lies both beyond the placid 
Romantic framing of the sublime or the brutal vitalism of imposed economic 
‘progress’. Its very hybridity – after all, today no one simply lives in the countryside 
whether in Irpinia in southern Italy or in rural Bangladesh, without the presence of 
television, cell phones, computers and Internet – suggests an altogether more extensive 
critical cartography. In a truly political and poetical sense this renewed sense of 
rurality promotes a subaltern and minor history able to challenge and deviate 
hegemonic versions of a unilateral modernity. Defending seed banks in rural India 
against Occidental monopolies, contesting economically and socially unviable high-
speed trains in the Alpine valleys of northern Italy, is, in however a ragged and 
unsystematic fashion, to express local democracies that are witness to a modernity that 
is not simply authorized by the existing institutions of political and economic power. 
Here the rural world is no longer something left over from yesterday, an appendage to 
today’s urban life, providing foodstuffs, recreation and relics of superseded life styles, 
but rather reveals the potential of a critical interrogation. A seemingly ‘lost’ world 
actually proposes new points of departure. The elaboration of the ‘loss’ can lead to the 
proposal of beginnings for those seeking to escape both the claustrophobic localism of 
blood and soil and the terrible costs of previous rural life. To elaborate that inheritance 
and work it through is also to re-elaborate modernity itself. Emigration, exploitation 
and poverty, both yesterday and today, are woven together along global axes. The 
abandoned village in the Apennines is not merely the sign of local disaster, it is the 
also the symptom of the processes of a planetary political economy. The question, 
then, is how to narrate this complex suturing of time and place, of modernity as 
rurality, in a manner that leads to a new, critical sense of ‘place’ and temporality that 
simultaneously exists along multiple scales of belonging: from the local bar to 
relatives in New York, to the extended family sustained in Internet. 
 
At this point, where does a place, a locality, a village and territory conclude, and 
something else commence? Perhaps the very linearity of this reasoning suggests 
another configuration in which ‘place’ and belonging is simultaneously proposed and 
lived in multiple sites. These offer other narrative forms. In an altogether more fluid 
topography, specificities such as poverty, organised crime, structural unemployment, 
migration and peripheral ‘underdevelopment’ are mapped on multiple maps that 
simultaneously conjoin the local with those wider, trans-national coordinates that also 
produce the local. Modernity at this point is opened up to interpretations that challenge 
a unitary logic. And alterity, as both the past that has never past and the presence of 
the rural and the extra-European world, radically interrupts the present. Such 
proximities invite us, as a minimum, not so much to speak for these negated matters, 
and thereby reproduce our authority, as to speak in their vicinity in a manner that leads 
precisely to the undoing of that authority (Djebar 1999).  
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THE SOUTH OF THE WORLD 
Borrowing this suggestion from the Algerian writer Assia Djebar, the final perspective 
I would like to propose consists in considering the interruption of the intellectual 
structure that produces the ‘south’ as a delimited space (Bhambra 2007). This 
obviously extends the Italian ‘southern question’ through a geography of powers onto 
a planetary scale. It also fruitfully intersects a growing intent to rethink modernity 
outside the geo-political structures and ethnographic dividends of European 
colonialism and their installation in the assumed ‘neutrality’ of the social sciences and 
a methodological homogeneity (Connell 2007). Brought into the multiple folds of a 
postcolonial revaluation, such a critical configuration permits us to re-open the archive 
in order to expose the present-day coordinates of a multi-layered modernity: the latter 
now emerges as a global, networked formation in historical process, rather than as a 
conceptual bloc or place (the Occident). If this is to world the West, it is also to re-
engage the ‘southern question’, and with it the south of Europe and the south of the 
world, with a very different set of critical languages and questions. 
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